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Review
Michael Oakeshott: Religion, Politics
and the Moral Life
Timothy Fuller (ed). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.
160pp.

Noël K. O’Sullivan*
Although students of Michael Oakeshott have special reason to be grateful to Timothy
Fuller for this carefully selected volume of ten of Oakeshott’s early and mid-career
essays, as well as for the scholarly introduction Fuller has provided, his book will also
appeal to general readers concerned to grapple with the central issues of modern life and
thought with which Oakeshott constantly wrestled. Four of the essays have never been
previously published and six are now made available in a more accessible form.
In the years after Oakeshott succeeded to Harold Laski’s chair at the London
School of Economics (LSE) he gave an annual talk to new undergraduates about the
purpose of a liberal education. This, he told them, is not merely to acquire facts, or skills,
or training for a career but is, rather, to acquire “what in the end, on [your] far distant
death beds, [you] will recognize as one of the things most worth having,” which is “a
mind and some thoughts of your own” (Oakeshott 2004: 334). The aim, in other words, is
to transform the ready made, off-the-peg self with which life begins into a self uniquely
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one’s own. Oakeshott did not elaborate in his talk, however, on what this self looks like.
Fuller’s anthology sheds valuable light on the principal sources on which Oakeshott drew
in the course of formulating the mature view of the self and its relation to the world found
in his magnum opus, On Human Conduct (1975).
In this respect the first two essays in the book, “Religion and the World” (1929)
and “Religion and the Moral Life” (1927), are especially instructive, pointing as they do
to three sources in particular. The first is religion, the self-avowed influence of which on
Oakeshott’s early thought contrasts markedly with his relatively rare references to it in
his late writings. Although Oakeshott’s sympathy lay in particular with the protestant
version of Christianity, with its emphasis on the inward nature of the spiritual life,
perhaps the most notable feature is his rejection of any kind of asceticism. The Christian
ideal of spirituality, he wrote, does not involve turning away from the world but means,
on the contrary, the ability to value the world properly by appreciating things as they are
in themselves, instead of treating them solely as contributions to outward success (30).
When success is the goal, the ability to enjoy the present which is the essence of
the spiritual life is lost since only future accomplishments, such as creating a reputation
or contributing to some art or science, are valued. Belief in success, Oakeshott adds,
carries with it the unfortunate notion that “a career is the main aim of life; for a career is
the only evidence a man has of external accomplishment, if he makes no contribution to
art, science or literature.” In that case, the melancholy result is that “for the sake of an
hypothetical old man who bear his name thirty years hence, the young man hoards his
energies and restrains his activities” (31). When spirituality is properly understood,
Oakeshott writes, religion is no longer “a power which governs life from the outside,”
with concomitant sanctions or rewards; it becomes “simply life itself, life dominated by
the belief that its value is in the present” (34). The reader is bound to pause here and
wonder quite what Oakeshott considered distinctively Christian about his concept of
“life” after he had stripped away from Christianity its traditional emphasis on doctrine,
eliminated the concepts of a priesthood and church, and rejected the Christian claim to be
the bearer of a privileged revelation. What is clear, at least, is that Oakeshott would not
permit any of the constraints usually associated with Christianity to stand in his way.
The second source of Oakeshott’s ethical inspiration is the ideal of selfrealization central to the ethics of his predecessors in the British Idealist tradition. Like T.
H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet, the early Oakeshott emphasizes the moral, non-
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egotistical, anti-utilitarian and social nature of this ideal, according to which the ultimate
goal of the self is only achieved within a whole (i.e., the Absolute, or God) that
transcends the mind/body and spirit/matter dualisms of classical Western metaphysics
and theology whilst simultaneously enhancing the integrity of particular selves in all their
diversity. In line with the British Idealist tradition, Oakeshott describes his own ideal of
spirituality as the realization of a self which is “its own achievement,” in the sense that it
carries “within each of its moments its whole meaning and value” (31–32).
In a third early essay, “Some Remarks on the Nature and Meaning of Sociality”
(1925), Oakeshott repeated his view that “God is the only principle of sociability that will
explain the facts of life,” but fleshed out the meaning of self-realization more fully by
emphasizing the virtue of patriotism in a way absent from the mature model of civil
association developed in On Human Conduct. “Patriotism,” he maintained, “is the basis
of all morality, in short, is the greatest emotion and intellectual effort of which we are
capable” (60–61).
The third source of Oakeshott’s ethical inspiration is the romantic tradition, the
influence of which is evident in, for example, his rejection of abstract universal ideals in
favour of a commitment to the emotional experience of love and friendship as “the real
life of a society” and “the principle of good” (59). It is also evident in his contempt for
the mediocrity of modern mass civilization—a contempt he shares with, amongst others,
Nietzsche. In a subsequent essay, Oakeshott’s Nietzschean sympathies were evident in a
simple distinction he drew between “individuals,” defined as “persons accustomed to
making choices for themselves,” and “anti-individuals” who have “feelings rather than
thoughts, impulses rather than options, inabilities rather than passions” (Oakeshott 1991:
73, 364). In the present collection, however, those sympathies are qualified by
Oakeshott’s commitment to the Idealist concept of the sociality of the self and surface
mainly in the contempt already noted which he expresses for the modern concern with
worldly success and material gain.
It is not only the sources of Oakeshott’s early concept of the self in religion,
Idealist philosophy and romanticism which are illuminated by Fuller’s anthology,
however. The essays also shed light on the development of several other vital aspects of
Oakeshott’s view of the self and its relation to the world, one of which is his sense of the
historicity of human experience. Although this theme is once again explored mainly in its
religious bearing in the essay “The Importance of the Historical Element in Christianity”
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(1928), a more general problem emerges about the relation between identity and time
when Oakeshott observes that concern with history has now become “part of our normal
Weltanschauung” (69). This problem, to be precise, is that:

Identity, so far from excluding differences, is meaningless in their absence,
just as difference or change depend upon something whose identity is not
destroyed by that change. It is not a matter of size or shape, or of anything so
abstract as spirit or purpose; on the contrary, it seems to lie, first, in the
avoidance of any absolute break in a thing’s existence, and, beyond that and
governing that, in some qualitative element to be discovered only by
reference to the general character of the thing concerned. (67)
At this intellectual stage, Oakeshott’s exploration of identity in difference did not go
beyond this formulation, which he described as a “by no means original suggestion.” Five
years later, however, a very original refinement of his early analysis emerged in
Experience and Its Modes, where he distinguished between an autonomous form of
historical identity, on the one hand, and the “practical” historical identity sought for
example in religion and politics, on the other. Later still, in perhaps his most impressive
philosophical achievement, Oakeshott characterized historical identity in On History and
Other Essays as a purely contingent form of identity which historical understanding seeks
to make intelligible without invoking generalization or teleology, either of which would
compromise contingency.
The five remaining essays selected by Fuller deal with the authority of the state,
the nature of politics and the definition of political philosophy. So far as the authority of
the state is concerned, although the essay is written in the shadow of Bosanquet, and
hence in terms far removed from those found in On Human Conduct, the early essay
nevertheless has two important continuities with Oakeshott’s mature theory of civil
association. One is Oakeshott’s insistence that political authority is moral, and therefore
distinct from mere power or domination. Only when the moral status of authority is
acknowledged is it possible to speak of obligation to a non-voluntary association (viz.,
the state) and to maintain, as Oakeshott does both in his early work and in his fully
developed theory of civil association, that the authority of the state is perfectly
compatible with the autonomy of the individual.
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The other continuity is Oakeshott’s claim that “a real authority is something
which we cannot go behind, something from which there is no possibility of appeal . . .”
(85). Oakeshott subsequently qualified this claim by allowing that there can in fact be an
appeal against authority, provided that the appeal is made to a higher authority within an
overarching constitutional framework and not to a supposedly higher principle of
rationality, or independent concept of natural law. In this respect his concept of authority
always remained close to that of Hobbes, despite the fact that in the early essay included
by Fuller his analysis of authority entails a description of the state (after the fashion of
Bosanquet) as “the totality in an actual community which satisfies the whole mind of the
individuals who comprise it” (83). Although Oakeshott’s early Idealist language differs
greatly from the more narrowly juridical vision of civil association found in his mature
thought, then, his search for an ethical conception of the state remained a constant theme
of his political philosophy, as did his insistence that there is no supra-political authority
to which an appeal against sovereign states can be made.
So far as the remaining essays are concerned, four themes emerge which are
familiar features of Oakeshott’s political philosophy. The first is Oakeshott’s consistent
refusal to allow that competence in political philosophy can confer a privileged position
on would-be public intellectuals committed to normative guidance of their fellow
citizens. It is this refusal which placed Oakeshott at odds with, for example, the
aspirations of Walter Lippman, Oakeshott’s review of whose The Public Philosophy
(1955) Fuller has included. The second theme—which is merely the other side of the
same coin—is Oakeshott’s conviction that the task of political philosophy is entirely
confined to explanation. As Oakeshott puts it, “where there is genuine philosophy, there
can be no guidance; if we seek guidance, we must ‘hang up philosophy’” (155). The third
theme is Oakeshott’s insistence on the need to distinguish his opposition to rationalism in
politics from a defence of irrationalism, with which it was often confused. As Oakeshott
wrote in a critical review included by Fuller of Hans Morgenthau’s Scientific Man Versus
Power Politics (1946), “the idea that human behaviour cannot be reduced to the
interaction of the abstractions of rationalism is confused [by Morgenthau] with the idea
that there are areas of human behaviour inherently impervious to rational analysis” (106).
The fourth theme is Oakeshott’s dismissive view of politics. Despite his praise of
patriotism in the early essay already noticed, he wrote in “The Claims of Politics” (1939)
that “political action involves mental vulgarity,” not least because of “the false
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simplification of life implied in even the best of its purposes” (93). Although in his late
work he valued civic sentiment highly, political activity itself he always regarded with
suspicion.
This paperback edition of Timothy Fuller’s volume is a welcome addition to the
constantly growing corpus of Oakeshott’s published work.
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